University of Mississippi

eGrove
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2014

The Middle Class Tax Relief And Job Creation Act Of 2012 And Its
Impact On Television Broadcasting And Future Broadband
Wireless Communications
David H. Cole
University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd
Part of the Journalism Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Cole, David H., "The Middle Class Tax Relief And Job Creation Act Of 2012 And Its Impact On Television
Broadcasting And Future Broadband Wireless Communications" (2014). Electronic Theses and
Dissertations. 659.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/659

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE MIDDLE CLASS TAX RELIEF AND JOB CREATION ACT OF 2012
AND THE FUTURE OF UHF TELEVISION AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

A Thesis
Presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
in the School of Journalism
The University of Mississippi

by
DAVID H. COLE
December 2014

Copyright David H. Cole 2014
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT
The upcoming Incentive Auction for the 600 MHz band will cause the relocation of
hundreds of UHF television stations while potentially freeing up as much as 120 MHz of
valuable electromagnetic spectrum for utilization by wireless communications providers. This
“new” wireless spectrum will allow wireless providers to increase their wireless broadband
capabilities and feed the ever-growing demand by consumers for more wireless broadband
capacity.
This thesis addresses the mechanics of the proposed auction platforms, the impact the
auction will have on existing television broadcasters, and explores some of the possible future
opportunities the repurposing of the 600 MHz band presents to wireless communications
providers and consumers.
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CHAPTER 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

On February 22, 2012 the U.S. Congress passed the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112-96). Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 empowers the FCC to conduct incentive auctions.
Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, commonly know
as the Spectrum Act, addresses public safety communications and electromagnetic
spectrum auctions. Section 6402, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(G), authorizes the
Commission to conduct incentive auctions in which licensees may voluntarily relinquish
their spectrum usage rights in order to permit the assignment by auction of new initial
licenses subject to flexible use service rules, in exchange for a portion of the resulting
auction proceeds.1
The FCC has decided to repurpose the 600 MHz band through the use of incentive
auctions. What impact will repurposing the 600 MHz band, currently UHF television channels
35 through 51, have on television broadcasting, wireless broadband communications, and the
consumers of both services?
The problem facing the FCC, and addressed in this thesis, is how to repurpose the 600
MHz band through an incentive auction platform, the possible band plans for use of the spectrum
once relinquished by UHF television stations, and the repacking of the UHF television stations
previously in the 600 MHz band that decided not to participate in the incentive auction.

1

Federal Communications Commission, Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities
of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2012, FCC 12-118, § 2(C).
1

The purpose of this thesis is to address the mechanics of the proposed auction, the impact
on television broadcasting – in particular the repacking of UHF television stations – and the
future opportunities the repurposing of the 600 MHz band presents to wireless broadband
providers and consumers. This paper will provide a layman’s guide to the most dynamic
spectrum change and challenge since the development of cellular communications and digital
television.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature related to the Federal Communications Commission’s upcoming incentive
auction to repurpose the 600 MHz band from UHF television to wireless broadband is centered
around the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, as passed by the U.S.
Congress, Pub. L. No. 112-96, §§ 6402, 6403, 125 Stat. 156 (2012), known as the Spectrum Act;
the Federal Communications Commission, Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2012, FCC 12-118; and the Federal
Communications Commission, Report and Order Expanding the Economic and Innovation
Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2014, FCC 14-50.
Additional literature includes public comments made by various industry groups (in
particular broadcasters), wireless communication providers, wireless microphone manufacturers,
cable television and satellite television system providers, and industry groups such as the
National Association of Broadcasters, the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association,
The Association of Independent Television Stations, and the Expanding Opportunities For
Broadcasters Coalition.
Numerous communications trade publications have addressed the issues, with each one
taking on the position of the different trade group or coalition they represent.

3

To date there are 1,516 public comment and exparte filings related to the incentive
auction. These filings are available to view and download through the FCC’s Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS) at http//apps.fcc.gov/ecfs.
The governing documents direct the FCC to: (1) hold an incentive auction for the 600
MHz portion of the UHF band, (2) relocate television stations that choose not to participate in
the auction to another portion of the UHF band below the 600 MHz portion of the UHF band,
and in some rare cases, to relocate a television station from the UHF band to the VHF band, (3)
auction off the spectrum relinquished by the participating and relocated television stations to
participating wireless communications providers, (4) take the proceeds of the wireless auction
and pay the participating broadcasters for their relinquished television channels, (5) take $1.75
billion of the incentive auction proceeds to cover the cost of relocating the non-participating
stations displaced by the auction, and (6) turn the balance of the auction proceeds over to the U.S.
Treasury – all before the end of 2019.

4

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in the development of this thesis differs from that usually
found in a typical research oriented thesis because this thesis is not research oriented.
Since March 2012 the author has been an active participant in the pre-planning
discussions with industry groups, as well as a consultant to the Federal Communications
Commissions’ (FCC) Media Bureau, regarding both the costs and timelines associated with the
repacking process envisioned in the proposed incentive auction for the 600 MHz band. In 2013
the author co-authored Widelity, Inc.’s Response to the Federal Communications Commission
for the Broadcaster Transition Study Solicitation – FCC13R0003, 2013.
The author has extensively reviewed the available literature as well as relied upon notes
made during numerous meetings with the FCC’s Media Bureau regarding possible repacking
scenarios and transition planning.
To June 16, 2014, the author represented Widelity, Inc. at the Federal Communications
Bar Associations’ seminar “Broadcast Spectrum Incentive and Forward Auctions”.
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CHAPTER 4

THE PROJECT

The Incentive Auction

Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, commonly known
as the Spectrum Act, addresses public safety communications and electromagnetic
spectrum auctions. Section 6402, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(8)(G), authorizes the
Commission to conduct incentive auctions in which licensees may voluntarily relinquish
their spectrum usage rights in order to permit the assignment by auction of new initial
licenses subject to flexible use service rules, in exchange for a portion of the resulting
auction process.1
FCC 14-50 Report and Order Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of
Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, will make “more spectrum available for mobile
broadband use” and “will benefit consumers by easing congestion on the Nation’s
airwaves, expediting the development of new, more robust wireless services and
applications, and spurring job creation and economic growth.”2
The Spectrum Act of 2012 provides for two auction platforms: (1) the reverse auction, in
which broadcasters who choose to relinquish some or all of their spectrum rights will participate
in and share in auction proceeds, and (2) the forward auction, in which broadband wireless
providers will participate in anticipation of acquiring duplex 5 MHz uplink/downlink licenses.

1

Federal Communications Commission, Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities
of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2012, FCC 12-118, § 2(C).
2
Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order Expanding the Economic and
Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2014, FCC 14-50, § 1.
6

The reverse auction determines the amount a broadcast licensee is willing to accept for
voluntarily relinquishing some or all of their spectrum usage rights.
Pursuant to that provision, broadcast television licensees may bid in the reverse auction to
indicate the amount of compensation that they would accept to relinquish different
spectrum usage rights, including the following (A) “all usage rights with respect to a
particular television channel without receiving in return any usage rights with respect to
another television channel”; (B) “all usage rights with respect to a [UHF] television
channel in return for receiving usage rights with respect to a [VHF] television channel”;
or (C) “usage rights in order to share a television channel with another licensee.”1
Reverse Auction

Under the proposed reverse auction, the broadcast licensee of a UHF station has three
options. First, they may choose to relinquish all spectrum usage rights. Upon successful
completion of the reverse auction the licensee turns their station off the air and relinquishes all
spectrum usage rights to the FCC for the pre-auction channel the station is occupying. In return
for relinquishing all of their spectrum rights, the former licensee will receive a portion of the
auction proceeds based upon the licensee’s bid in the reverse auction. Second, the licensee may
chose to relinquish all of the spectrum rights of their current pre-auction UHF channel in return
for being relocated to an available VHF channel and a portion of the auction proceeds based
upon the licensee’s bid in the reverse auction. Third, the licensee may chose to relinquish all
usage rights of their currently pre-auction UHF television channel in order to share a television
channel with another station in the same television market, and again, for a portion of the auction
proceeds based upon the licensee’s bid in the reverse auction.

1

Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, Spectrum Act §
6403(a)(2).
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The methodology the FCC has adopted for the reverse auction is a descending clock
format.
“In the bidding round, stations will be offered prices for one or more bid options and will
indicate their choices at these prices. The prices offered to each station for options will
be adjusted downward as the rounds progress in a way that accounts for the availability
of television channels in different bands in the repacking process.2
The descending clock format “is a multiple round, or dynamic, procedure in which
bidders would indicate their willingness to accept iteratively lower payments in exchange for
relinquishing rights . . . auction prices would start high and decline over time.”3 Under this
scenario, the broadcast licensee would indicate their willingness to continue to participate in the
auction at each declining level until they reached a tipping point at which time they would not be
willing to accept the bid price for the relinquishment of their spectrum usage rights. This auction
model is very complicated and will require the FCC to develop a software system capable of
running this type of auction. While complicated, this auction model is anticipated to maximize
the amount of spectrum acquired in the reverse auction for the lowest possible price.
Bidders, broadcasters voluntarily participating in the reverse auction, will indicate price
levels that they would accept for the bid options, or drop out of the auction and remain on their
existing pre-auction licensed facility, subject to relocation in the repacking process at the end of
the reverse auction.
Prior to the commencement of the reverse auction, the FCC, through public notices, will
provide guidance to participating broadcasters about the way the FCC will establish initial bid
pricing for stations participating in the auction. The FCC also hopes the number of broadcasters

2
3

FCC 14-50, § 2(30).
FCC 12-118, § 3(A)(1).
8

willing to voluntarily participate in the auction will increase after the release of the public notices
that provide guidance on bid pricing.
The FCC will set initial spectrum clearing targets for each television market prior to the
commencement of the reverse auction for a given television market. This initial spectrum
clearing target will be based upon the number of broadcasters in a given market that are
voluntarily choosing to participate in the reverse auction and the anticipated number of stations
in the market that are not participating in the reverse auction and will require repacking at the
conclusion of the reverse auction.
As an example of the reverse auction bid option A, “Broadcaster X” determines that they
are interested in relinquishing all of their spectrum usage rights and are interested in participating
in the FCC’s reverse auction. To that end Broadcaster X must first determine if he is eligible to
participate. The reverse auction is limited to full power television stations and Class A television
stations operating on both commercially allocated channels and noncommercial educational
(NCE) reserved channels. As a full power commercial UHF station licensee, Broadcaster X is
qualified, and determines the “value” of the spectrum usage rights he is willing to relinquish to
be $30 million following the guidance provided by the FCC in their yet to be published public
notices.
The broadcaster enters the reverse auction pool with other stations in the television
market that have decided to participate. Some of the stations that are also participating in the
auction are willing to relinquish their spectrum rights at different levels, or values, than
Broadcaster X.
The stations that choose to participate in the reverse auction notify the FCC of their
decision to participate. The FCC determines the target amount of spectrum it would like to clear

9

in the market, based upon the number of participating stations, and announces the opening bid
price for the bid options. At this point the participating stations either accept the opening bid
price or reject the opening bid price. Each station that rejects the opening bid price leaves the
reverse auction and will be repacked if necessary. The stations that accept the opening bid price
are then provided with a lower, or descending, bid price for the three bid options. For each
round the participating stations either accept the bid price for one or more of the bid options or
reject the bid prices at, which point they leave the reverse auction. The auction continues until
the FCC has either cleared the desired spectrum amount or there are no participating stations.
If the bid is accepted in the reverse auction, Broadcaster X will go off the air within 90
days of the conclusion of both the reverse and forward auctions and relinquish all of his spectrum
usage rights to the FCC. The relinquished spectrum rights will then be included in the forward
auction. If the auction price submitted by the FCC is not accepted, then Broadcaster X will not
relinquish any of the spectrum rights and will continue to broadcast on his currently assigned
frequency, and will be subject to the involuntary repacking that will occur at the conclusion of
the reverse and forward auctions.
While on the surface this may seem to be a relatively straightforward process, in reality it
is quite complicated. For each station bid that is not accepted, that station will remain on the air.
Thus, there is a high likelihood that the station will have to be repacked into the remaining
television broadcast spectrum, even if the station is not operating in the targeted range of
channels 31 to 51. Stations operating below channel 31 may have to be relocated (“repacked”)
to free up spectrum for stations in the upper UHF band that will also require relocation.
Upon further examination, Broadcaster X has decided to participate in the reverse auction,
but has chosen to relinquish the spectrum rights for the UHF channel Broadcaster X is currently
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the licensee of, and is willing to accept an allocation of spectrum rights to a VHF channel (bid
option B). Broadcaster X has determined the appropriate level of compensation for this
“migration” from the UHF band to the VHF band to be $25 million. As with the previously
discussed bid option A, Broadcaster X participates in the bidding. If the FCC’s “bid” is accepted,
then Broadcaster X will receive auction proceeds and be assigned a new channel in the VHF
band, assuming there is space in the VHF band in the broadcaster’s market. Broadcaster X will
be fully responsible for all costs associated with the move to the newly assigned frequency in the
VHF band.
Broadcaster Y, a non-commercial educational UHF station licensee also located in the
same market with Broadcaster X, has decided to participate in the reverse auction and has chosen
to participate under bid option C, relinquishing their spectrum usage rights so they can share
Broadcaster Z’s channel. Under this arrangement, Broadcaster Y has worked out an agreement
with Broadcaster Z to share Broadcaster Z’s spectrum usage rights. Broadcaster Y has accepted
a bid of $20 million to relinquish the broadcast usage rights and to share Broadcaster Z’s channel.
Broadcaster Y will be fully responsible for the expenses associated with the shared channel
arrangement with Broadcaster Z. All compensation arrangements between broadcasters Y and Z
are between those parties, the FCC will only compensate Broadcaster Y from the auction
proceeds based upon the accepted bid.
In the reverse auction, each participating station is offering the same goods for sale, that
is, 6 MHz of spectrum for a particular geographic area. The difference is the size of the
geographic area covered by each station, based upon each station’s licensed coverage contour,
and the population within the geographic area covered by each station, again based upon its
licensed coverage contour, and its channel in the UHF band. This is illustrated in TABLE 1 on
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the following page. TABLE 1 compares stations on two separate television channels, 28 and 51
respectively, with four stations on each channel from four different sized markets.
How will a broadcaster know how much their television station is worth in the reverse
auction? One way to consider the value of a television station is to look at the price per
population covered, or “price per pop”. This metric simplifies part of the analysis for the FCC
by allowing the FCC to consider the maximum population available for the lowest bid price
offered in the reverse auction. For example, if two stations in a television market are each
bidding in the reverse auction, the station that provides the largest audience coverage for the
lowest “price per pop” would be the logical bid for the FCC to accept. So, while station “X” has
placed a higher bid in the auction than station “Y”, if station “Y” provides greater market
coverage and thus a lower “price per pop”, it would win the bid.
By choosing Broadcaster Y’s bid, the FCC clears spectrum in the market as well as
allowing a station to continue to broadcast in the market by sharing spectrum usage rights with
Broadcaster Z.
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TABLE 1
Population Comparison for Television Stations on Channels 28 and 51

Market
New York
Memphis
Rochester
Anchorage
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA
Memphis
Augusta, GA-Aiken, SC
Bend, OR

DMA
Rank
1
50
78
146
6
50
112
193

Call
Letters
WNBC
WREG
WUHF
KTVA

Television
Channel Households
28
7,461,030
28
672,390
28
402,300
28
158,120

KDTV-DT
WPXX
WFXG
KOHD

51
51
51
51

2,518,900
672,390
264,130
64,160

Contour
Population
20,141,597
1,623,756
1,138,548
355,801

Area w/in
Contour
in sq. km
26,575
29,707
13,024
8,846

Pops w/in
sq. km
758
55
87
40

8,004,907
1,588,915
687,327
200,925

32,264
29,070
17,196
13,303

248
55
40
15

Sources:
2014 Complete Television, Radio & Cable Industry Directory, Grey House Publishing
Chesapeake RF Consultants, LLC, Joseph M. Davis, P.E.
Nielsen 2013-2014 DMA Ranks, The Nielsen Company
Television Households - Television Bureau of Advertising

This logic holds true not only for stations in the same market but also for different market
sizes. A full power station on channel 28 in New York is generally going to have a lower “price
per pop” than a station in Memphis on the same channel, due to the difference in the population
covered by each station in their respective markets (see the population within square kilometer in
table above).
Spectrum usage rights are also more valuable in congested wireless markets than in more
rural markets where spectrum is generally less constrained, such as – Bend, Oregon. The FCC
will take this value differential into consideration when looking at the bid acceptance process for
the reverse auction.
Other factors to be considered in the bid acceptance process for the reverse auction may
include the difficulty of repacking a particular station “because they would block more potential
channel assignments to other stations”4, population served by the bidding stations

4

FCC 12-118, § 3(A)(2).
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(demographics), the density of the population served by the bidding stations (population per
square kilometer of coverage), and the availability of VHF spectrum in a given market for
relocation to the VHF band. These factors may be used to weigh the bids provided by the
broadcasters in the reverse auction.
The New York City television market is the number one Nielsen designated market area
(DMA 1) with 7.46 million television households. It consists of 7 VHF stations (full and low
power) and 22 UHF stations (full and low power). Of the 29 stations serving the New York City
DMA, 22 are full power stations with 18 of the full power stations occupying channels in the
UHF band and 9 of the full power stations located within the 600 MHz band. Both the Fox and
CBS owned and operated (O&O) stations in New York are located in the 600 MHz band as well
as the flagship stations for Univision, Telemundo, and Azteca America.
The need for additional wireless spectrum in markets like New York City will place a
great demand on the FCC to clear spectrum for wireless usage via both the reverse auction and in
the repacking of the remaining stations. TABLE 2 on the next page illustrates the New York
City television market.
A possible advantage in the New York City market is the opportunity to co-locate many
of the stations together using broadband antennas and sites such as One World Trade Center,
Empire State Building, or Four Time Square. Co-locating stations at one site, especially with
broadband antennas, eliminates co-channel interference, thus making it possible to “stack”
channels on top of each other. As an example, it would be possible, utilizing a broadband
antenna, to have channels 20-26 all co-located at one site.

14

TABLE 2
New York City Television Stations
Call
Letters
WKOB-LD
WBQM-LD
WNYZ-LP
WABC
WNJB
WPIX
WNET
WEBR-LD
WMBC
WLIW
WFTY
WNYE
WASA-LD
WTBY
WNBC
WFME
WPXN
WFUT-DT
WPXO-LP
WNJU
WWOR
WNYN-LD
WXTV
WSAH
WCBS
WNYW
WLNY
WRNN
WNJN

Digital
Channel
2
3
6*
7
8
11
13
17
18
21
23
24
25
27
28
29
30
30
34*
36
38
39
41
42
43
44
47
48
51

Full
Power

Low
Power
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Network
Affiliation
Daystar
CNN Latino
Audio
ABC
PBS
CW
PBS
GCN
IND
PBS
Uni Mas
IND
Estrella
TBN
NBC
REL
ION
Uni Mas
Mundo Fox
Telemundo
My TV
Azteca America
Univision
Shopping
CBS
Fox
IND
News
PBS

Sources:
FCC TV Query at www.fcc.gov
StationIndex.com
An * indicates a station still broadcasting with an analog signal.
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600 MHz
Band

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

To be a participant in the reverse auction, a station must provide the following
information:
•

The applicant’s name and contact information;

•

The license(s) (including station and channel information, full power or Class A status,
and NCE status) and the associated spectrum usage rights that may be offered in the
reverse auction;

•

Any additional information required to assess the spectrum usage rights available for the
reverse auction;

•

The identity of the individuals authorized to bid on the applicant’s behalf;

•

The applicant’s ownership information as set forth in section 1.2112(a) of the FCC rules
(47 C.F.R. § 1.2112 and 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(ii)(B));

•

For a channel sharing applicant, the channel the parties intend to share and any necessary
information regarding the channel sharing agreement;

•

An exhibit identifying any bidding agreements, bidding consortia, or other such
arrangements to which the applicant is a party, if permitted;

•

Any current delinquencies on any non-tax debt owed to any federal agency, but only if
we (FCC) determine in this proceeding that such information is necessary in order to
assess the licensee’s eligibility to participate in the reverse auction . . . that would allow
the Commission to offset incentive payments by the amount of the licensee’s outstanding
delinquencies;

•

Any additional information that the Commission may require.5

Furthermore, applicants would be required to certify on the pre-auction application that:

5

•

The applicant meets the statutory and regulatory requirements for participants in the
reverse auction, including any requirements with respect to the applicant’s licenses
for the spectrum usage rights offered in the reverse auction;

•

If the applicant is a Class A television station, that it is, and will remain during the
pendency of its application(s), in compliance with the ongoing statutory eligibility
requirements to remain a Class A station;

•

For a channel sharing applicant, that the channel sharing agreement is consistent with
all Commission rules and policies, and that the applicant accepts any risk that the

FCC 12-118, § 9(A)(2).
16

implementation of the channel sharing agreement may not be feasible for any reason,
including any conflict with requirements for operation on the shared channel;
•

For a channel sharing applicant, that its shared channel facilities will continue to
provide minimum coverage to its principal community of license as set forth in the
Commission’s rules;

•

The applicant agrees that the bids it submits in the reverse auction are irrevocable,
and binding offers of the licensee;

•

The applicant agrees that it has the sole responsibility for investigating and evaluating
all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the bids it submits in
the reverse auction; and

•

The individual submitting the application and providing the certification is authorized
to do so on behalf of the applicant.6

Based upon my own conversations with members of the Media Bureau, I believe the
Commission will ask for additional information pertinent to the re-packing process. The
anticipated additional questions will be addressed in Chapter 4’s discussion of the re-packing
process.
Forward Auction

The forward auction “will identify the prices that potential users of repurposed spectrum
would pay for new licenses to use the spectrum.”7 In past spectrum auctions “a fixed quantity of
spectrum is licensed based on a band plan defined in the service rules. The licenses in the
forward auction will depend upon how much spectrum the reverse auction clears in specific
geographic areas.”8 In this situation the FCC will not know how much spectrum it will have
available for auction until the reverse auction has run its course. The Spectrum Act gives the
FCC the authority to run the two auctions simultaneously. It would be very difficult to clear
6

FCC 12-118, § 9(A)(2).
FCC 12-118, § 3(B).
8
FCC 12-118, § 3(B).
7
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broadcast spectrum and auction off that same spectrum at the same time. Therefore, the FCC has
decided to run the reverse auction and then the forward auction.

Spectrum Band Plans

The spectrum band plans provided in the FCC’s Report and Order Expanding the
Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions (FCC 14-50)
are designed to maximize the repurposing of spectrum in the 600 MHz band for broadband
wireless utilization. The plans range from two sets of paired blocks (36 MHz scenario) to twelve
sets of paired blocks (144 MHz scenario). Since the amount of spectrum available in any given
television market will vary with the amount of spectrum that can be cleared through the reverse
auction and the repacking of the remaining television stations, the FCC has adopted a “market
variability” approach – flexible allocation of spectrum blocks based on geographic areas and
market needs rather than a lowest common denominator for all markets.
The 600 MHz Band Plan we adopt consists of paired uplink and downlink bands offered
in 5 + 5 MHz blocks. The uplink band will begin at channel 51 (698 MHz), followed by
a duplex gap, and then the downlink band. We will license the 600 MHz Band on a
geographic area license basis, using Partial Economic Areas (PEAs). Further, we will
accommodate market variation: specifically, we will use the 600 MHz Band Plan in all
areas where sufficient spectrum is available; and in constrained markets where less
spectrum is available, we may offer fewer blocks, or impaired blocks, than we generally
in the 600 MHz Band Plan. Finally, we establish technically reasonable guard bands to
prevent harmful interference and to ensure that the spectrum blocks are as
interchangeable as possible.9
There are a number of firsts in the FCC’s 600 MHz Band Plan. These include the use of
paired 5 MHz blocks for uplink and downlink, the use of Partial Economic Areas (PEAs) as the
9

Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order Expanding the Economic and
Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2014, FCC 14-50, § 3
(A)(2)(45).
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licensed geographic blocks, and the market variability aspects of the 600 MHz Band Plan. There
is no way of knowing the amount of spectrum that can be repurposed in each market until after
the reverse and forward auctions and the repacking of the remaining television stations. Prior
spectrum auctions have been very structured in the allocation of spectrum to be auctioned and
most wireless spectrum auctions have relied on either Cellular Market Areas (CMAs) or larger
market areas as the designated license blocks. The inclusion of 5 + 5 MHz blocks will facilitate
the 600 MHz band supporting Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) operations, an operating
technology that is especially well suited to the signal propagation characteristics found in the 600
MHz band.10
In developing the 600 MHz Band Plan, the FCC has focused on five goals as the guiding
tenets of the Band Plan. These five goals include: (1) utility, (2) certainty, (3) interchangeability,
(4) quantity, and (5) interoperability.11 The 600 MHz Band Plan achieves these goals by making
spectrum blocks interchangeable from a technical and functional aspect. The use of paired 5
MHz blocks provides the forward auction participants with a known entity, thus maximizing
both the utility and the certainty of the spectrum blocks in the auction. The Plan also
incorporates an uplink/downlink scheme that is reliably used internationally, and should facilitate
international border operations with minimal cross border coordination.
The FCC adopted PEAs (Partial Economic Areas) because PEAs are smaller than
Economic Areas (EAs), yet fit within EAs, and can easily be aggregated into larger areas such as
Major Economic Areas (MEAs) and Regional Economic Areas (REAs).12 PEAs, like CMAs,
divide urban and rural areas into separate service areas, thus allowing rural carriers to focus on
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their desired markets without having to acquire urban blocks.13 The FCC also adopted PEAs to
encourage entry into the auction by applicants that want to provide wireless broadband services
on a local level. For major service providers, the PEAs can be aggregated into large block
creating regional coverage areas.14

Uplink and Downlink Blocks

Television channels are allocated as 6 MHz blocks with each block assigned to a channel.
The UHF (Ultra High Frequency) band consists of 228 MHz of spectrum divided into 38 six
megahertz channels (14 – 52). The incentive auction is the FCC’s chosen methodology to clear
broadcasters from the 600 MHz band and to repurpose the freed up spectrum for wireless
broadband and other services. 5 MHz blocks are the spectrum block allocations for broadband
wireless service in the repurposing of the 600 MHz band through the incentive auction.
The Band Plan calls for pairs of 5 MHz spectrum block, one block allocated for uplink
transmission and one block allocated for downlink transmission. With all the band plans
considered by the FCC, the uplink portion of the paired spectrum blocks has always been
assigned to the upper most portion of the 600 MHz band and descending. These are known as
channel 51 down plans. The Commission considered a number of variations for the downlink
portion of the 5 + 5 MHz pairs, but settled on a plan that will provide for a nationwide standard
for uplink transmissions and allows for variability in the downlink assignments.
In each instance, the amount of spectrum available in a given market is directly
dependent on the amount of spectrum cleared through the reverse auction and the repacking
13
14

FCC 14-50, § 3(A)(2)(18).
FCC 14-50, § 3(A)(2)(c)(69).
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process. The cleared spectrum will then be auctioned off in the forward auction. The number of
5 MHz paired blocks will be determined by the absorption rate (supply and demand) for that
particular market. The low demand for spectrum in a market will allow the FCC more flexibility
in allocating uplink/downlink blocks for current and future expansion in the market.
As would be expected, the markets that need the most wireless broadband spectrum are
the large urban markets that have the greatest number of television stations. The Commission is
hopeful that some of the smaller broadcasters in those markets will voluntarily choose to
participate in the reverse auction; the more television stations that participate in the reverse
auction, the more broadcast spectrum that can be repurposed for wireless use. The smaller the
number of participating stations in the reverse auction, the greater the number of stations that
will require repacking, and thus a decrease in the amount of spectrum in the market to be
repurposed.
It is anticipated that the Commission’s opening bid pricing will be greater in the more
congested television markets as an incentive to increase the number of stations voluntarily
participating in the reverse auction. The Commission’s opening bid pricing, not yet made public,
will most likely be less robust in the medium and small television markets. These markets have
fewer stations and initially a smaller need for wireless broadband spectrum, but may be
significantly impacted by repacking changes needed in adjacent major television markets. The
opening bid pricing may increase in these medium and small markets that are adjacent to major
markets in order to facilitate repacking in the major markets.
Of course the main difficulty facing the Commission is the relationships between
adjacent television markets. A change in one market has a domino effect into all of the adjacent
markets. For example, the New York City television market, while bounded on one side by the

21

Atlantic Ocean, is surrounded on three sides by five television markets – Philadelphia, Wilkes
Barre-Scranton, Hartford-New Haven, Binghamton, and Albany-Schenectady-Troy. Any
repacking change made to a television station in the New York City market must be coordinated
with these five immediately adjacent markets, these five markets have adjacent markets in which
the changes must also be coordinated. The complexity of these changes and the FCC’s new
software, TV Study, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Band Plan Examples

While the FCC has developed eleven Band Plans, I will address only four of these plans,
and provide examples of the four plans that focus on the portions of the Band Plans that are
unique to that particular plan. The examples chosen for illustration are representative of two
possible scenarios (1) for television markets with minimal spectrum clearance and (2) for
television markets with a high level of spectrum clearance. In all instances the uplink portion
starts at channel 51 and descends down from there. This provides a nationwide configuration
that provides the wireless operators with a portion of the Band Plan that is consistent from
market to market. The downlink portion is separated from the uplink portion by a duplex guard
band 11 MHz wide. This guard band provides sufficient separation from the uplink and
downlink signals to eliminate the potential for interference using an FDD modulation platform.
Additional guard bands are required to protect the remaining broadcast operations from
interference from the wireless broadband operations and vice versa. These guard bands are
typically three to seven megahertz wide with some as wide as 11 MHz. The guard bands may be
used for non-licensed operations as well as for wireless microphone use.
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In all Band Plans, channel 37 is not utilized for either broadcast operations or wireless
broadband operations. Channel 37 is currently set aside for medical telemetry use and in the
proposed band plans will continue to be used for medical telemetry and will also be made
available for some non-licensed use.

60 MHz Scenario

The 60 MHz Band Plan scenario consists of four pairs of 5 MHz blocks, four uplink and
four downlink blocks. The 60 MHz Band Plan preserves 26 UHF channels for broadcast
operations (excluding channel 37) and repurpose four pairs of 5 MHz blocks (40 MHz) for
wireless broadband operations. There are two guard bands – one 9 MHz guard band separating
channel 41 from the downlink blocks A-D and the 11 MHz duplex guard band separating the
uplink blocks A-D from the downlink blocks.

Downlink'Blocks
Uplink'Blocks
Guard'Bands

As illustrated above, each downlink block (A) has a matching uplink block (A). It is this
paired block configuration that will facilitate the wireless broadband providers in implementing
the Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) operations that most providers requested of the FCC. In
the 60 MHz Scenario the FCC will repurpose four sets of paired uplink/downlink blocks.
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78 MHz Scenario

The 78 MHz Band Plan scenario consists of six pairs of 5 MHz blocks. The 78 MHz
Band Plan preserves 23 UHF channels for broadcast operations (excluding channel 37) and
repurpose six pairs of 5 MHz blocks (60 MHz) for wireless broadband operations. There are two
guard bands – one 7 MHz guard band separating channel 38 from the downlink blocks A-F and
the 11 MHz duplex guard band separating the uplink blocks A-F from the downlink blocks.

108 MHz Scenario

The 108 MHz Band Plan consists of eight pairs of 5 MHz blocks. The 108 MHz Band
Plan preserves 18 UHF channels for broadcast operations (excluding channel 37) and repurpose
eight pairs of 5 MHz blocks (80 MHz) for wireless broadband operations. In this scenario there
are four guard bands – an 11 MHz guard band after channel 32 and downlink block A, a 3 MHz
guard band after downlink block B and channel 37, a 3 MHz guard band between channel 37 and
downlink block C, and an 11 MHz duplex guard band between downlink block H and uplink
block A. As illustrated in this Band Plan scenario, as the FCC repurposes more spectrum
because of the continued use of channel 37 for non-broadcast and non-wireless operations; the
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inclusion of additional guard bands is required and creates a scenario with more interruptions in
the continuity of the downlink portion of the Band Plan.

126 MHz Scenario

The 126 MHz Band Plan consists of 10 pairs of 5 MHz uplink/downlink blocks. The 126
MHz Band Plan preserves 15 UHF channels for broadcast operations (excluding channel 37) and
repurpose ten pairs of 5 MHz blocks (100 MHz) for wireless broadband operations. As in the
108 MHz Band Plan this scenario also utilizes four guard bands – a 9 MHz guard band after
channel 29 and before downlink block A, a 3 MHz guard band after downlink block F and before
channel 37, a 3 MHz guard band between channel 37 and downlink block G, and an 11 MHz
duplex guard band between downlink block J and uplink block A. This band plan provides 50
MHz of downlink spectrum and 50 MHz of uplink spectrum.

These are just four examples of the eleven Band Plans developed by the FCC for the
reallocation of the 600 MHz spectrum from UHF broadcast operations to wireless broadband
operations. Illustrations of all eleven Band Plans are provided in the Appendix.
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Repacking the Spectrum
At the conclusion of the Incentive Auction, the television stations that chose not to
participate in the Reverse Auction, or the stations that chose to participate but were not
successful in the Reverse Auction, will have to be repacked, or relocated, in the non-repurposed
portion of the UHF band remaining in their television market. As with the earlier discussions of
the Incentive Auction, the FCC has no way of knowing how much of the UHF spectrum will
remain for television broadcast use until the end of both the Reverse and Forward auctions.
During the reverse auction bidding process the Commission will undertake a “repacking
feasibility check”15 to ensure that each station that remains on the air after the incentive auction
is reassigned to a channel that meets the regulatory requirements. That is, the FCC will make
“all reasonable efforts to preserve, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the coverage area
and population served of each broadcast television licensee, as determined using the
methodology described in OET-69”.16 Final channel assignment and optimization will be
finalized after the “final stage rule” is satisfied and bidding has stopped.
In order to conduct the “repacking feasibility check” each station will have an
“interference-paired” file and a “domain” file, combined these files are known as the “constraint
files”17. “The interference-paired file will include a list of all the other television stations that
could not be assigned to operate on the same channel or on an adjacent channel with each
particular station.”18 “The domain file will include a list of all the channels to which the station
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Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order Expanding the Economic and
Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2014, FCC 14-50, § 3(B)(1).
16
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, §§ 6403, (b)(1)(B),
(b)(2), 125 Stat. 156 (2012) (Spectrum Act).
17
FCC 14-50, § III(B)(1)(114).
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FCC 14-50, § III(B)(1)(114).
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could be assigned considering “fixed constraints”, that is, incumbents in the bands other than
domestic television stations that are entitled to interference protection at fixed geographic
locations and on specific channels.”19 The FCC cannot successfully end an auction segment
without meeting the “final stage rule” that requires the non-participating television stations have
a channel assignment and that the proceeds of the forward auction provide sufficient funds to
cover the costs of the repacking for that particular television market and the associated
administrative costs.20
As should be apparent to the reader, the number of moving parts in the Incentive Auction
changes with every variable and every possible iteration during both the reverse and forward
auctions. The “clearing target”21, estimated prior to the commencement of each reverse auction,
is the Commission’s estimation of the amount of spectrum to be cleared in a given market based
upon the number of broadcast stations that are willing to relinquish their spectrum usage rights at
the announced opening prices by the FCC. The “clearing target” dictates the number of stations
in a given market that will require repacking. Each time a station drops out of the reverse
auction the repacking feasibility checker will be run to ascertain channel availability for the
station that dropped out of the auction. Each station that drops out of the auction has the
potential to change the “clearing target’s” viability for a given market.
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TV Study

The Spectrum Act requires the FCC to make “all reasonable efforts to preserve, as of the
date of the enactment of this Act, the coverage area and population served of each broadcast
television licensee, as determined using the methodology described in OET-69”22 when
repacking a non-voluntary television station to replicate the station’s coverage area and
population served. The determination of the station’s coverage area and population served are to
be determined as of February 22, 2012, the date the Spectrum Act was enacted, by the
methodologies in OET Bulletin No. 69, titled “Longley-Rice Methodology for Evaluating TV
Coverage and Interference.” 23 OET-69 provides guidance for the implementation of LongleyRice coverage and interference studies. The FCC maintains a computer program that utilizes the
methodologies for the Longley-Rice studies. The computer program incorporates population
data, geographic terrain data, and data about a station’s transmission facility including antenna
height above average terrain, effective radiated power, and antenna pattern constraints, if any.
The output of the FCC’s Longley-Rice computer program is a prediction of the subject station’s
coverage area and population served.24 As with any computer program, the output is always
subject to the validity of the input data. The FCC’s original Longley-Rice computer program
was developed before the implementation of digital television and was used to study both the
analog NTSC television signals and the digital ATSC signals to predict digital coverage
replication for the transition to digital television. The databases utilized by the original LongleyRice model have not been updated and in several cases are no longer supported by the
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government agencies that developed the data in the first place. As an example, the population
database used by the original Longley-Rice program is 2000 census data.
The FCC has developed a new computer program, TV Study, for performing the coverage
area and population served estimates. The new program relies on updated inputs, in particular:
(1) population data from the 2010 census, (2) terrain data with a finer level of accuracy, (3)
corrected known inaccurate data in the FCC’s databases, (4) more effectively addressed antenna
constraints, in particular, antenna beam tilt, (5) more precise calculation of engineering data
previously addressable in the Longley-Rice model, and (6) the establishment of a uniform
calculation grid.25 TV Study is capable of dealing with the volume of data processing required to
support the reverse auction and the need to repeatedly run the “repacking feasibility checker”.
The older Longley-Rice model cannot, in a timely manner, deal with the volume of study
parameters to support the reverse auction. Another flaw in the original Longley-Rice model is its
inability to produce uniform calculation grids. A uniform nationwide calculation grid is essential
for the analysis of coverage area and population served for the repacking process.26 The updated
data and upgraded software provide a more accurate prediction of a station’s coverage area and
population served.
Anytime there is a proposed change in the “yard stick”, there will be groups that object to
the use of the new “yard stick”, pointing out several complaints: (1) there was nothing wrong
with the old one, it has been used for decades and has served broadcasters well, (2) use of the
new yard stick will produce results that are different from the old yard stick, and (3) will perhaps
harm some of the users. In this instance it is the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
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and several broadcasters that are calling the FCC’s move to TV Study as a changing of the rules
that violate the Spectrum Act.27
The NAB has strongly objected to the use of TV Study, stressing that the Spectrum Act
specifically calls for the use of OET-69 as it existed in February 2012 without any updated data
and their interpretation of “all reasonable efforts” is a “hold harmless” provision, i.e., that in no
way should the repacking of the UHF spectrum have any detrimental impact on the stations that
are relocated because of the repurposing of the spectrum to wireless broadband.28 The NAB
interprets “all reasonable efforts” as stated in the Spectrum Act to mean the Commission is
required to “precisely and strictly preserve broadcasters’ coverage areas and population served
without considering the other objectives of the Spectrum Act.”29
The FCC interprets “all reasonable efforts” to mean the Commission should take into
account all of the objectives set forth in the Spectrum Act including the repurposing of the 600
MHz Band for uses other than television broadcast. In the Commission’s interpretation, they
(FCC) must consider all the objectives set forth in the Spectrum Act and weigh the objectives on
the greatest impact each objective would have to the general public.30 A further discussion of
broadcaster objections to the FCC’s use of TV Study and the FCC’s databases is found later in
the document under National Association of Broadcasters.
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Catalog of Costs

Television stations that chose not to participate in the reverse auction, or which were not
winning bidders in the reverse auction, will be “repacked” or relocated into the remaining UHF
spectrum. Stations that are involuntarily repacked are entitled to compensation for reasonable
transition expenses, i.e., cost of a new antenna, cost of installation of a new antenna, cost of a
new transmitter, with installation, and similar expenses as outlined in the “Catalog of Potential
Expenses and Estimated Costs” that is included in Widelity, Inc.’s 2013 report to the FCC. The
“Catalog” identifies potential expenses that a repacked television station may incur as part of the
relocation process and provides an estimated cost range for the identified expense. Television
broadcasters are encouraged to use the Catalog as a planning tool for estimating the anticipated
expenses that they may incur as well as a guideline for filing for initial funding based upon
estimated costs provided in the Catalog. The final reimbursement to the broadcaster will be
based upon actual expenses incurred, documented by the broadcaster with invoices and contracts
for services provided. The FCC will use the Catalog to review broadcasters’ requests for initial
funding and in the review of the actual expenses incurred. While the Catalog does not include all
possible costs that may be associated with a possible repacking, it addresses the most likely costs
associated with the repacking process.
The Catalog breaks down the expenses into logical groupings based upon the equipment
types and services anticipated in the repacking process. These include: (1) Transmitter and InBuilding Expenses, which would include retuning of existing transmitters, replacement of
existing transmitters with new transmitters, and other transmitter related expenses, (2) Antennas,
including the cost of a replacement antenna, the cost of removal and disposal of the existing
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antenna, and the cost of installation and proof of performance for the replacement (new) antenna,
(3) Transmission Lines, including the cost of removal of the existing transmission line, the cost
of the new transmission line, and the cost of installation of the new transmission line, (4) Tower
Equipment and Rigging, including the cost of structural analysis on existing towers, the cost of
strengthening existing towers to meet the latest Revision G standard for towers, and rigging costs
associated with the removal and installation of existing and new antennas and transmission lines,
(5) Interim Facilities, including costs that may be incurred by a broadcaster that has to construct
and operate an interim facility on either their existing channel or their repacked allocated channel
to facilitate broadcast operations until the final construction can be completed on their full-power
facility on the repacked channel, (6) Special Cases, which includes extraordinary expenses
directly related to operations on channel 14 and distributed transmission services31 (DTS) both of
which have expenses not usually found with channels or traditional transmission services, (7)
Miscellaneous Expenses not addressed in the previous categories, and (8) Professional Services
including the services of structural engineers, consulting RF engineers, engineering services for
installation and proof of performance of specialized equipment, and legal fees.32 The list of
anticipated expenses is extensive, but since every broadcast installation is unique, there will be
expenses that are not directly addressed in the Catalog. The following sections look at each of
the expense categories in more detail. For the purpose of this discussion, all examples will be
based upon UHF television stations, the most likely stations to be repacked.
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Distributed transmission services rely on multiple transmitter and antenna systems all
operating on the same channel to distribute, or broadcast, the over the air signal. There are only
a handful of stations in the U.S. using a DTS transmission platform and most of these stations are
located in the Western U.S. and are in locations with challenging terrain issues. Additional
equipment and consulting RF engineering services are required for such an operation.
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Transmitter and In-Building Expenses

The transmitter is the engine of a UHF television station. The transmitter takes the
electronic signal produced at the studio and places the signal into a carrier wave based upon the
assigned frequency of the station, then amplifies the signal and “pumps” it up the transmission
line to the antenna where it is radiated over the air. Modern UHF television transmitters are
typically one of two types, an Inductive Output Tube (IOT) type or a Solid State type transmitter.
Both transmitter types perform the same function. IOT transmitters rely upon a large inductive
output tube to generate the final output power. These IOT transmitters are generally found in
configurations of one, two, or three IOT cabinets and have output power ranges of between 20
kilowatts (kW) to 90 kW. Solid State transmitters rely on banks of solid state devices, large
output transistors, ganged together to produce the desired output power. These transmitters may
be air-cooled or liquid-cooled and have output power ranges between 1 kW to 20 kW for aircooled transmitters and 1 – 50 kW for liquid-cooled transmitters. Traditionally, IOT transmitters
have been more efficient in the use of electrical power, and generally more cost effective to
purchase and operate. That has changed in recent years and Solid State transmitters are now
achieving the same levels of efficiency as the IOT transmitters and may be more cost efficient in
the long run due to the high cost of replacing IOTs. A single IOT can cost between $35,000 $45,000, while failure of a high output power transistor is usually in the range of $1,500 - $2,500
each.
A television station that has been assigned a new channel, or repacked, may be able to
have its transmitter retuned rather than replaced. There are a number of factors that will
determine whether a transmitter can be retuned. The first question to consider is how close the
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newly assigned channel is to the original channel. If the channel is adjacent, say channels 33 and
34, then it is reasonable to assume that the station can have its transmitter retuned. This type of
channel change would be considered a “minor banding issue” change and the cost for retuning
the transmitter would be dependent upon the type of transmitter. For an IOT type transmitter the
cost of a minor banding issue retune would be in the range of $115,000 - $315,000, depending on
the number of IOT cabinets in the transmitter. For a Solid State transmitter that same retuning
would be in the range of $10,000 - $100,000, depending on the power level and the number of
solid-state transistor banks involved. In both cases, anytime a transmitter changes from one
channel to another a new mask filter will be required. The cost for a new mask filter will range
from $3,000 - $90,000, depending on the channel and the output power of the transmitter being
retuned.33 An RF engineer who specializes in major transmitter modifications may perform the
retuning of an existing transmitter. These types of modification can take one to two weeks of
engineering time, during which time the transmitter being retuned is off the air. Thus there is the
need for the station to either operate on an existing backup transmitter, if one exists, or the need
to build an interim transmitter facility for the station to continue to broadcast while the retuning
of the main transmitter is taking place.
If the transmitter cannot be retuned because the “distance” between channels is too great,
say channel 51 to channel 22, or because the design of that particular transmitter does not
support retuning of the transmitter, or the transmitter is no longer supported by the manufacturer,
or the cost of retuning would exceed the cost of a new transmitter, then the transmitter must be
replaced. As with the retuning, the original transmitter will be out of service while being
replaced, so the station must either operate on its existing backup transmitter, if the station has
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one, or build and operate an interim transmission facility while the original transmitter is being
replaced (a recurring theme in the discussion of the repacking process). While the expense
associated with the replacement of an existing transmitter with a new transmitter again will
depend on the configuration of the original transmitter plant as well as the power requirements of
the new assigned channel, the FCC is generally looking to replace the original transmitter with
one of like kind and utility. The expense range for IOT transmitters; including installation, new
mask filter, and proof of performance, is between $450,000 - $1,205,000. The expense range for
Solid State transmitters; including installation, new mask filter, and proof of performance, is
between $35,000 - $1,075,000.34 A current estimate of delivery time from transmitter
manufacturers is 90 to 120 days from placing the order with a 50 percent deposit and delivery to
the station. The delivery schedule will change when the FCC announces the number of stations
impacted by the repacking process and orders flood in.
Other possible expenses in the Transmitter and In-Building Expenses category include
possible electrical work required for the new transmitter, air handling upgrades, if needed, and
additional building space, if required.

Antennas

Television broadcast antennas come in two classifications: (1) frequency and pattern
specific and (2) broadband pattern specific. The majority of domestic television stations rely on
frequency and pattern specific antennas. As the name implies, the antenna is manufactured for a
channel’s specific characteristics for that particular geographic location and is not designed for
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operation on another channel, much less at a different location. In some instances it is possible
to use a frequency and pattern specific antenna for an adjacent channel, i.e., channels 22 and 23,
but those instances are very infrequent and the cost of determining if an antenna can be used on
an adjacent channel are prohibitive. Broadband pattern specific antennas are designed for
multiple stations operating within a given channel range, i.e., channels 24 – 36, to share the
antenna. In this instance each station provides their signal to a combiner system that combines
the signals together and delivers the combined signals to the broadband antenna for propagation.
In this antenna design, all of the stations must share the same coverage pattern – one cannot have
two directional channels and two omnidirectional channels on the same antenna. It is estimated
that between 10 – 15 percent of all full-power domestic television stations operate on broadband
antennas.
The Spectrum Act requires the FCC to use “all reasonable efforts to preserve” a repacked
station’s coverage area and population served. To do this, the FCC is not considering relocating
stations from their existing transmitter sites, but using “all reasonable efforts” to look at the cost
of replacing the equipment necessary to replicate the existing coverage. Therefore, if a station is
operating with a frequency and pattern specific antenna, the FCC would consider the cost of
replacing a frequency and pattern specific antenna.
The estimated costs for frequency and pattern specific antennas range from $50,000 $270,000, depending on whether the antenna is side mounted or top mounted on the tower or
support structure and the pattern, polarization, and power handling characteristics of the
antenna.35
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The estimated costs for broadband pattern specific antennas range from $450,000 $1,000,000, depending on the number of stations ported into the combiner/antenna system.36
In all instances, the estimated cost for antennas does not include the cost of tower rigging,
installation, and the cost of removing the existing antenna from the tower. Special consideration
must be given to stacked antennas, where one antenna is mounted onto the top of another
antenna. The cost of the bottom antennas, “will likely double due to the increased cost of
structural components, such as heavier steel and longer structures”.37
A current delivery time estimate for a single station frequency and pattern specific
antenna is 90 – 120 days depending on the size and pattern characteristics of the antenna. A
current delivery time estimate for a multi-station broadband antenna with combiner system is
120 – 150 days, depending on the number of stations, pattern characteristics of the antenna, and
the antenna gain characteristics.

Transmission Lines

As with antennas, there are different types and sizes of transmission line. The
transmission line, typically of a coaxial design, is used to carry the output signal from the
transmitter to the antenna. Transmission line can be flexible or rigid. Flexible transmission line
can have either a foam or air dielectric in the coaxial design. Flexible transmission line is a
single continuous piece running from the transmitter to the antenna. Rigid transmission line
comes in sections that are 19.5, 19.75, or 20 feet in length. Rigid transmission line is bolted
together section by section, and the different sections lengths have properties that are best for
36
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certain frequencies or channels. In some instances a station may be required to change out its
transmission line when it is repacked to a different channel because the existing transmission line
sections interfere with the new channel. Transmission line is typically priced out in a cost per
foot based upon the type of line, flexible or rigid, and the diameter of the line, 7/8” to 8 3/16”.
The cost per foot of transmission line ranges from $10 per foot to $327 per foot. The price per
foot estimates includes hangers and elbows, but does not include the cost of installation, which is
covered in the tower section of the Catalog.38 As an example, a station having to replace 2,200
feet of 6 1/8” rigid transmission line would have an estimated expense of $330,000 - $407,000,
plus the cost of removing the existing transmission line and installing the new transmission line.
Pricing of transmission line is subject to change based upon the commodity prices of copper.
A current estimated delivery time for flexible transmission line is 45 – 90 days,
depending on the size and length of the transmission line and the availability of copper. A
current estimated delivery time for rigid transmission line is 60 – 120 days, depending on the
number of sections required, the diameter of the line, and availability of copper.

Tower Equipment and Rigging

Television broadcast antennas require a support structure to hold the antenna. Like FM
radio television is a line of sight service. The height of the antenna to the horizon is the typical
coverage area; the higher the antenna is above ground, the greater the coverage area. This can be
achieved by mounting the antenna to a tower, a tall building, or even the top of a mountain.
Antenna heights are listed as both a height above average terrain (HAAT) and a height above

38

Catalog of Costs, 2013, 8-9.
38

ground level (AGL). The height above ground level gives the height at which the antenna is
physically above ground while the height above average terrain gives an indication of the
antenna’s relative height when compared to the average terrain in the station’s coverage area.
An antenna may have a HAAT of 1,900 feet, but an AGL of only 400 feet because it is mounted
on a 400-foot tower located on the top of a mountain or high ridge.
The expenses associated with the Tower Equipment and Rigging category focus directly
on expenses related to a station’s tower and the installation or removal of equipment on the
station’s tower. A station may have more than one tower and may incur expenses related to
equipment on more than one tower.
Towers, as structures, are subject to engineering design parameters and over time the
engineering requirements change. There are numerous towers in existence that were constructed
between the 1950s and early 2000s that do not meet current standards of the Electronics
Industries Alliance/Telecommunications Industry Association (EIA/TIA) RS-222-G “Structural
Standards for Antenna Supporting Structures and Antennas”, commonly known as Rev. G.39 If
the broadcaster is required to make a major modification on an existing tower, such as changing
out an antenna and transmission line, or adding an additional antenna to an existing tower, then
the tower will require at least a structural engineering tower load study. If the tower does not
have current documentation (design specifications), a tower mapping study will be required as
well. Based upon the outcome of the structural engineering load study, the tower may require
modifications to bring it into compliance with Rev. G, and to be able to support the proposed
changes or additions to the tower. Estimated expenses for an engineering load study range from
$5,000 - $10,000, depending on the configuration of the tower. Current costs for mapping an
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undocumented tower are estimated at $12,000 - $16,000. Modifications to a tower can range
from minor to serious and the pricing for those modifications can range from $100,000 $1,000,000.40
If a tower cannot be modified to bring it into compliance, the construction of a new tower
may be required. The pricing of new towers is difficult to estimate because of the variables
associated with each construction. Some of the factors include the type of soil the tower is being
constructed on, the height of the tower, the loading of the tower, and the location of the tower.
Location can actually have a significant impact on the cost of tower. For example, towers
located in hurricane zones are more costly to construct than similar towers in non-hurricane
zones. Local building permits and zoning requirements can also play a major role in the cost of
constructing a new tower. A new 1,500 foot tower, without an elevator, and normal soil
conditions would have an estimated cost of $2,500 per foot of tower height, or $3.75 million.41
The time to construct such a tower, assuming the land is available and zoning is not an issue, is
typically between four and six months. As would be expected, weather can cause major delays
in the construction of a tower.
Other costs associated with towers include the cost of rigging the tower for the removal
of an existing antenna and/or transmission line, the installation of a new antenna and/or
transmission line, additional costs associated with complex towers such as towers with
candelabras and/or stacked antennas, and remote locations or tall buildings where helicopter lifts
are required. These costs are highly variable and are dependent on the requirements for each site.

40
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Interim Facilities

As the title implies, these expenses would be associated with the construction of interim
facilities necessary in the repacking transition from the originally assigned television channel to
the newly assigned television channel. There are no guidelines provided by the FCC as to
whether these interim facilities should be on the existing channel or on the new channel. For
some broadcasters it may be more appropriate to build an interim facility on the newly assigned
channel to facilitate a quick transition to the new channel while the main transmitter and antenna
system are converted over to the new channel. Other stations, due to delays in the transition in
adjacent markets, may opt to build an interim facility on the old channel and operate on the
interim facility while the transmitter and antenna facilities are converted to the new channel.
Unlike the transition to digital television, where stations operated both an analog and a
digital signal simultaneously and made the final transition to digital on the same day, this
repacking will occur over time with each market making the change at a different time. A delay
in an adjacent market will have a domino effect causing delays to other markets and
compounding the delays in the transition. At the present time there is no foreseeable solution but
the extended rollout or repacking transition.
Interim facilities may include transmitters, antennas, transmission line, tower engineering
load studies, tower rigging, interior RF system components, professional services including
consulting RF engineers, lawyers for FCC filings, and experts for required specialized studies,
zoning hearings, and the like. Typically an interim facility would not mirror a full-power
station’s transmitter and antenna facility, but be of a lower power capability, sufficient to provide
coverage of the majority of the station’s current coverage area and population served. Delivery
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times for the components necessary for an interim facility are difficult to estimate without having
an idea of the number of stations that will be impacted by the repacking, and how many of the
stations that are impacted have current backup facilities that could be used as an interim facility
during the transition. Part of this chapter includes two examples or case studies of repacking
scenarios.

Special Cases, Miscellaneous Expenses, and Professional Services

Most special cases are difficult to identify and estimate. The Catalog includes three
specific examples of special cases: (1) channel 14 related expenses, (2) distributed transmission
service related expenses, and (3) AM pattern disturbance expenses. In each case these expenses
are predominately professional engineering fees directly related to special characteristics of these
three examples.42 Miscellaneous expenses are, by their very nature not easily categorized and
are variable with the facts and circumstances of each particular broadcaster. Professional
services expenses are directly related to FCC filings, transition project management services,
field engineering services, and tower and/or antenna structural height services (FAA consultants,
NEPA Section 106 environmental review, and environmental assessments, if required). The
Catalog provides guidance regarding typical fees, but each station’s fee structure will be based
upon the services required.
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Repacking Case Studies

Widelity, Inc. granted permission for the inclusion of these two case studies in this thesis.
The thesis author is a co-author of the Widelity, Inc., Response to the Federal Communications
Commission for the Broadcaster Transition Study Solicitation – FCC13R0003 report published
December 9, 2013. The first case study looks at an extreme move, channel 50 to channel 15
where the second case study looks at a super complicated move involving multiple stations
operating on the Mount Sutro tower in San Francisco. All cost estimates in the case studies are
based upon the Catalog of Costs, and the time estimates are based upon discussions with
engineering sources, manufacturers, and in the case of the Mount Sutro case study, the vice
president in charge of the Mount Sutro facility.

Case Study 1

Channel 50 moves to Channel 15
Assumptions
Channel 50, top mounted single channel slot antenna top mounted on a 1,500’ tower with 100’
horizontal run from base of tower to transmitter building.
•

8 3/16” rigid transmission line, 19.5’ sections

•

No auxiliary antenna or transmitter

•

Transmitter, 90 kW three cabinet IOT (tube) transmitter

•

There is space, electrical service and HVAC capacity for a lower power auxiliary transmitter

•

Repacking moves the station to Channel 15

•

Channel 15 requires 20’ line sections

•

Consulting RF Engineer determines Transmitter TPO of 90 kW, transmission line of 7 3/16”
diameter, replacement antenna included vertical polarization

•

Structural Engineer determines necessary tower reinforcement/modifications for new antenna
(top mounted) and for rented side mounted interim antenna and flexible transmission line
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Figure	
  1	
  Cost	
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  Channel	
  50	
  to	
  15	
  

Cost	
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  By	
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General	
  &	
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  System
Transmitter	
  System
Total	
  (Rounded)
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  17,000
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  657,000
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  645,800
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  1,375,000
$	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  2,695,000

Figure	
  2	
  Cost	
  Estimate	
  Channel	
  50	
  to	
  15	
  

Estimated timeline after receipt of the new assignments:
1. 3 months for pre-project planning including structural analysis for new antenna systems and
of the tower, consulting RF Engineer assignment analysis, discussion with transmitter and
antenna manufacturers, structural engineer identifies tower deficiencies and develops plan for
reinforcement. Place order to rent interim antenna and transmission line. Order new antenna,
transmission line, interim/auxiliary transmitter and new main transmitter. File for CP for
main operation. Order reinforcement steel, receive anticipated delivery date, schedule crew to
reinforce the tower.
2. 2 months. Tower reinforcement work, receive rental antenna and transmission line. Install
interim antenna and transmission line.
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3. 3 months. Wait for delivery of new antenna, transmission line, auxiliary transmitter and
main transmitter. With anticipated delivery dates, schedule tower crew and field engineers.
File for STA for interim operation.
4. 3 months. Receive ordered equipment, install interim/auxiliary transmitter, sweep interim
antenna/line, proof of performance on interim/auxiliary transmitter. Commence interim
operation under STA. Remove existing main transmitter, install new main transmitter.
Remove existing top mounted antenna and transmission line, install new top mounted antenna
and new transmission line. Sweep antenna and line. Proof of performance on new
transmitter.
5. 1 month. Switch over to new main operation. File for new station license.
6. 1-2 months. Schedule tower crew to remove interim antenna and transmission line In some
cases, not covered in this study, a station may plan to keep the interim antenna as a permanent
auxiliary antenna that can serve as a backup in the future.
Estimated total time, assuming no glitches, 12 to 14 months.43
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Case Study 2

This case study (Sutro Tower) is an example of a super-complicated site with multiple channel
reassignment. The cost elements and time estimates used in this case study were derived from
direct interviews with individuals responsible for the site. As a super complicated site, the costs
are not typical and are specific to this site and, as such, are not directly reflected in the Catalog
of Potential Expenses and Estimated Costs.

Image	
  3	
  Sutro	
  Tower	
  at	
  Mount	
  Sutro,	
  San	
  Francisco,	
  CA	
  

Assumptions:
•

Five of the ten UHF stations on Sutro Tower are repacked (four from one combined antenna) and
one on another combined antenna.
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•
•
•
•
•
•

The four station combined antenna must be replaced with a new antenna and a new dual
transmission line (6 1/8”) – this panel antenna is currently supporting KGO’s Channel 7 VHF
antenna (stacked antennas).
The one UHF station able to reuse an existing antenna will require a new combiner module for
both the main antenna and also for the auxiliary antenna.
A new auxiliary antenna and transmission line will be required for four of the stations.
Three of the five stations will have to replace their existing main and auxiliary transmitters, two
of the stations can retune their existing main and auxiliary transmitters.
New mask filters will be required for all five stations, total of ten mask filters (main and auxiliary
for each station).
New interior transmission line (interior RF plant) will be required for both the main and auxiliary
transmitter plants for three of the five stations – two stations can use existing interior RF plant
with the exception of the mask filters.

Figure	
  4	
  Cost	
  Elements	
  Sutro	
  Tower	
  	
  

Cost	
  Estimates	
  By	
  Category
General	
  &	
  Administrative
Tower
Antenna	
  System
Transmitter	
  System
Total	
  (Rounded)

$	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  798,000
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  1,150,000
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  3,589,000
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  6,350,000
$	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  11,887,000

Figure	
  5	
  Cost	
  Estimate	
  Sutro	
  Tower	
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Estimated timeline after receipt of the new assignments:
1. 9 months for pre-project planning including legal for building permit filing, structural
analysis for new antenna systems, consulting RF Engineer assignment analysis, discussion
with transmitter and antenna manufacturers. File for building permit, file for CP for main
operation.
2. 18 months to prosecute the building permit through the City of San Francisco. Receive
building permit.
3. 6 months to order and receive equipment, schedule tower crew and field engineers. File for
STA for interim operation.
4. 2 months for initial tower crew work for interim operation (remove old interim antenna and
transmission line, install new interim/auxiliary antenna and transmission line), retune two
auxiliary transmitters including replacing mask filters, install new combiner module, replace
three existing auxiliary transmitters with new solid state interim/auxiliary transmitters, install
new combiner for four station interim/auxiliary antenna system, proof of performance on all
transmitters, sweep new antenna/combiner, sweep existing antenna/combiner with new
module. Commence interim operation under STA.
5. 6 months to build out new main operations including removal and installation of three main
transmitters, retuning of two main transmitters with new mask filters and one new combiner
module, remove KGO VHF antenna (KGO will now operate on their auxiliary antenna),
remove old 4 station panel antenna and transmission line, install new dual 6 1/8” transmission
line run, install new (bottom of stack) 4 station combined panel antenna, reinstall KGO VHF
antenna on top of stack, proof of performance on all transmitters, sweep new
antenna/combiner/line, sweep existing combiner/line system with new combiner module.
File for new station licenses.
Estimated total time, assuming no glitches, 41 months.44

According to the Report and Order, the FCC has allotted 39 months for repacked
television stations to complete the transition. The first 90 days are set aside for all of the
impacted television stations to file their Construction Permits (CPs). There is difficulty with the
timeframe established by the FCC because the stations will not know their allocated station
assignments until the completion of the forward auction. If, as expected, there are several
hundred television stations all clamoring for structural engineers to assess towers and consulting
RF engineers to prepare engineering exhibits for new CPs, there will be a much greater demand
for services than can be addressed by the limited number of resources. The FCC recognizes the
problem, but is holding firm to the 90 day window for filing CPs.
44
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As shown in Case Study 1, assuming there are no “glitches”, the station would be able to
accomplish the transition at a cost of approximately $2.7 million. If one assumes that 500
television stations would require repacking at an average cost of $3 million per station, the direct
costs of the transition would be $1.5 billion. Congress, through the Spectrum Act (2012), gives
the FCC a maximum of $1.75 billion to cover all of the costs associated with the repacking. If
the assumed number of stations impacted by the repacking is 600, amounting to approximately
one third of the full-power stations licensed in the U.S., at an average cost of $3 million per
station, then the $1.75 billion will be insufficient.
Super complicated sites, such as Mount Sutro, the Empire State Building, and Willis
Tower in Chicago will have much longer timelines and potentially higher expenses than the
average broadcaster due to extraordinary factors such as zoning requirements, the use of
helicopters for lifting antennas to the rooftop masts, union labor, and work scheduling
requirements (the Empire State Building limits work on the broadcast antennas to between 3 am
and 5 am, requires union labor and the laborers are paid for an 8 hour day).
The timeline indicated in Case Study 2 is an example of a “quick” process at a super
complicated site. While the estimated costs for Case Study 2 are below average when divided by
the number of stations involved ($2.4 million per station), the timing required to accomplish the
transition goes beyond the FCC’s mandated 39-month window.
At the present time there is no indication from the FCC as to how they will deal with
stations that are caught up in litigation, zoning issues, environmental studies, transition delays in
adjacent markets, or other delays caused by factors outside of the station’s control.
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The World’s Most Groundbreaking Spectrum Auctions

The upcoming incentive auctions for the 600 MHz band are, as described in the Federal
Communications Bar Association’s (FCBA) continuing legal education seminar on June 16,
2014, “the World’s Most Groundbreaking Spectrum Auctions”. As Americans, we see hype as a
good thing - the greatest, most stupendous, colossal, phenomenal whatever it is; but in the case
of the upcoming 600 MHz band auctions, the FCBA may have gotten the adjective right. The
proposed forward and reverse auctions have garnered their fair share of comments, both pro and
con, from numerous industry pundits and trade associations. This chapter will address some of
those comments and the proposed timelines that are currently being discussed.

National Association of Broadcasters

The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has been one of the most vocal industry
associations regarding the proposed auctions. The latest focus has been on the recent Report and
Order (June 2014). The NAB points out that the Report and Order identifies technical and
policy issues that need to be addressed to conduct a successful auction, but also correctly points
out that the FCC has deferred those decisions to some “yet to be determined” future date(s).
According to the NAB, this lack of clear direction by the FCC has placed the broadcasting
industry into a“confused, perplexed, and unsure” state. The NAB, in its June 16, 2014
presentation at the FCBA Spectrum Auctions seminar, identified six broadcaster concerns: (1)
repacking – how it will impact member stations, (2) coverage area – concern over a reduction in
coverage area based upon the use of TV Study, (3) translators – at the present time the FCC has
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provided no guidance regarding the use of translators, (4) FCC inaction, (5) uncertainty –
unrealistic construction timetables that do not guarantee timely relocation or full compensation,
and (6) wireless microphones – wireless microphones currently operate on spectrum that will be
subject to repurposing in the 600 MHz band auction.1
At the present time there are no real estimates of how many television stations will
voluntarily relinquish their spectrum rights in the reverse auction or how many television stations
will be impacted by the repacking of the 600 MHz band. The NAB is raising legitimate concerns,
that at the present time the FCC has not addressed.
The NAB has raised concerns over the replication of coverage area and population served
for repacked stations, in particular the FCC’s proposed use of the new TV Study computer model
to accomplish the calculation of the pre-auction coverage and the post-repacking coverage. As
mentioned earlier, the NAB’s position is that the Spectrum Act calls for the use of the old
Longley-Rice model originally used for developing digital television coverage estimates. The
old model relies on 2000 census data and three arc-second terrain data mapping. The new TV
Study computer model relies on 2010 census data and one arc-second terrain dataset for terrain
elevation mapping – the FCC’s computer model uses the most recent census data and a finer
degree of accuracy in terrain mapping.
Regarding the coverage area component, the original OET-69 methodology relied upon a
three arc-second terrain dataset that is no longer distributed, maintained, or supported by the U.S.

1

National Association of Broadcasters, Spectrum Auctions, June 16, 2014, Powerpoint slides
provided to participants at FCBA seminar “Broadcast Spectrum Incentive and Forward
Auctions”.
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Geological Survey (USGS).2 The nominal resolution, or accuracy, of one arc-second is
approximately 30 meters. The nominal resolution of three arc-seconds is approximately 90
meters.
To test the validity of the change from a three arc-second resolution to a one arc-second
resolution, the FCC conducted a test of predicted field strength values using both a three arcsecond dataset and a one arc-second dataset for terrain elevations. The FCC compared the
predicted field strength values for eight full-power UHF television stations to actual field
strength values for the same eight television stations that were collected in the 1950s by the
Television Allocations Study Organization (TASO). The actual field strength values from the
TASO study are publicly available. In all instances the mean error between predicted and
measured field strength values either decreased or remained constant in every case with the one
arc-second data. Therefore, the one arc-second dataset predictions are more accurate than those
using a three arc-second dataset.3 Even with the FCC’s validity test via the predicted and actual
field strength values, the NAB wants to force the FCC to rely on an outdated dataset that is no
longer maintained, supported, or distributed by the U.S. government agency responsible for all
official mapping.
In regards to the population component, the NAB believes that the only valid
measurement of the population within a station’s coverage area is to use the 2000 census data
and the old Longley-Rice methodology described in OET-69. The “NAB argues that we (FCC)
should continue to use 2000 Census data, claiming that its preliminary analysis of TV Study with
2010 population data shows that 14 percent of broadcast licensees will experience a decrease in
2

Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order Expanding the Economic and
Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 2014, FCC 14-50, § III
(B)(2)(b)(150).
3
FCC 14-50, § III (B)(2)(b)(152).
52

predicted population served.”4 The FCC’s evaluation, using the same data, showed a similar
reduction in predicted population served, but also showed that 88 percent of full-service
broadcasters will experience an increase in predicted population served.5 The NAB appears
quite adamant that the 2000 Census data be utilized in the calculation of predicted population
coverage while ignoring the Spectrum Act’s dictate that the population to be replicated for
repacked stations is based upon the coverage as of February 22, 2012; this point in time is well
past the year 2000. The 2010 Census data would be much more appropriate for predicting the
population being served on February 22, 2012. As pointed out by the FCC, “broadcast stations
experiencing a “loss” in predicted population served were, in fact, serving a smaller population
on February 22, 2012, than predicted using 2000 Census data because the 2000 Census data is
outdated.”6
Lastly, the NAB’s insistence on relying on 2000 Census data ignores actual population
migration that has been occurring over the last twenty to thirty years. The NAB’s methodology
rewards stations that have actually lost population with “phantom” population based upon 2000
Census data and denies the benefits of increased population to stations that have seen actual
population growth, based upon 2010 Census data, by relying upon the outdated 2000 Census data.
If the FCC’s evaluation of TV Study is correct, and 88 percent of full-service television stations
saw an increase in predicted population served based upon 2010 Census data, then the NAB is
ignoring their members in the 88 percent that saw population growth and only advocating for
their members in the 12 percent that saw a population decrease when comparing the 2010 Census
data to the 2000 Census data.

4
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The NAB raises other issues of a very technical nature that due to the engineering
expertise required to address, discuss, and comprehend, are beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it so say that the NAB, in its role as an advocate for radio and television broadcasters in
the U.S., wants to assure its members that it is doing all it can to ameliorate the impact the
repacking will have on stations that are involuntarily repacked due to the reverse and forward
auctions.

Diminishing Resources

As a result of the FCC’s announced spectrum auctions and the subsequent repacking of
the UHF television spectrum, television stations are postponing any investments in transmission
infrastructure (towers, transmitters, antennas, and transmission line). The impact of the FCC’s
decisions to auction off the 600 MHz band and subsequently repack the remaining UHF stations
is being felt by not only the television broadcasters, but more so by the companies that provide
both the equipment and the underlying support services related to the transmission infrastructure.
Since the completion of the move to digital television in 2009, there has been a marked decline
in the demand for new television antennas, transmitters, and related equipment. This decline has
been compounded by the FCC’s announced spectrum auctions and a freeze on any new
construction permits – thus freezing out the equipment manufacturers.
Dielectric, the manufacturer of approximately 65 percent of all full-power television
antennas in use in the U.S., announced that it was closing its doors right after the NAB
convention in Las Vegas in April 2014. Dielectric announced that they would complete the
fabrication of the current antennas in production, but would not produce any more antennas or
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transmission lines that were ordered but not currently in production. Dielectric also announced
that all support and consulting services would be terminated and all the staff would be let go.
The impact of this announcement by the largest domestic television antenna manufacturer sent
shockwaves though the industry. Fortunately for the industry, Sinclair Broadcast Group
announced the acquisition of Dielectric from SPX Corp. in June of 2014, and Dielectric, LLC, as
it is now known, will continue to provide its full compliment of products and services to the
broadcast industry.7 While the Dielectric story has had a happy ending, thus far, that has not
been the case for all.
In March 2014, “Electronic Research Inc. (ERI), a Chandler, Indiana based manufacturer
of RF components, waveguide, and antennas, laid off 22 employees (18 percent of its workforce),
an apparent consequence of the FCC’s policy aimed at freeing up TV spectrum for the wireless
industry.”8 ERI, a direct competitor to Dielectric, has cut its workforce by almost one-fifth to try
and weather the drought in RF equipment acquisition. ERI has the advantage of being more
diversified than Dielectric, with its main businesses being FM radio antennas and combiner
systems and broadcast tower construction. While ERI is a player in the television antenna arena,
especially after buying Andrew Corp.’s television antenna and transmission line businesses in
2003, it historically has only a 15 – 20 percent penetration in the television antenna business.
With Dielectric’s announcement in April of closing down the business, the industry was looking
at ERI to take up the slack. But with Sinclair Broadcast Group’s acquisition of Dielectric, ERI

7
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http://www.tvnewscheck.com/article/68321/sinclair-steps-in-to-buy-dielectric (accessed June 28,
2014).
8
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has had no impetus to ramp up production and continues to operate with the current smaller
workforce.
The latest blow to the RF equipment field comes with the July 15, 2014 announcement
that LARCAN, the Canadian manufacturer of both solid state and vacuum tube television
transmitters closed their doors on July 10, 2014.9 LARCAN had been a provider of television
transmitter equipment since the 1950s and was a leading proponent and manufacturer of solid
state television transmitters. This latest closing leaves three current manufacturers of television
broadcast transmitters – Gates Air, formerly Harris Broadcast, COMARK, and Rohde Schwarz.
Both Gates Air and COMARK are domestic manufacturers while Rohde Schwarz is
based in Germany. Gates Air represents about two-thirds of the digital television transmitters
currently on the air in the U.S., with COMARK running a distant second. Both Gates Air and
COMARK offer both solid state and inductive output tube (IOT) television transmitters. Rohde
Schwarz manufactures only solid-state television transmitters and has recently developed a line
of high power solid state transmitters that rival the IOT transmitters in output power and
efficiency, making them a viable option for consideration in the repacking.
Other resource groups that have diminished since the completion of the transition to
digital television include consulting RF engineers, field service and installation engineers, tower
crews that are certified for tall towers, tower manufacturers, and structural engineers specializing
in broadcast tower design, analysis, and construction. All of these groups will be required to
facilitate a timely repacking of the television spectrum upon the completion of the reverse and
forward auctions. The decline in these resources has been caused by multiple factors, with
retirement being the largest contributor in the professional engineering areas. Lack of demand
9

James E. O’Neal, “LARCAN Closes Its Doors,” TV Technology, (July 15, 2015):
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for tower construction, especially tall tower construction, has seen many of the working crews
disbanded. It is estimated by industry experts that only twelve to fourteen tall tower crews
remain actively working in the U.S., and these crews are currently providing maintenance and
repair services to existing television and FM radio broadcasters.10
Current demand for these services are insufficient for the remaining providers to increase
staffing, especially since the FCC has provided neither a definitive number of stations identified
for the repacking nor a timetable for the commencement of the reverse auction.

Timeline for Broadcast Incentive Auction

The estimated timeline provided by the FCC on June 25, 2014 outlines the major
mileposts to the completion of the Incentive Auction. The remainder of 2014 will include
proceedings to address (1) the potential impact the Incentive Auction may have on low power
television stations (LPTV) and television translator stations (currently not included in the
Incentive Auction), (2) the revision of Part 15 of the rules for the use of unlicensed devices in the
600 MHz guard bands and remaining television spectrum, (3) the needs of wireless microphone
users, and (4) a methodology to prevent harmful “inter-service interference” between television
and wireless broadband operations as well as outreach to broadcasters to provide informational
materials including estimated auction values.11
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In the first quarter of 2015, it is anticipated that the FCC will adopt its “Auction
Procedure Public Notice” establishing the final auction protocols for auction participants. The
Media Bureau will then announce the Pre-Auction Licensing Deadline. This deadline is for
stations that were issued construction permits (CPs) prior to the April 2013 freeze, Class A
stations making a digital conversion, and any other stations with modifications that were pending
prior to the freeze. These stations must complete their conversions and modifications prior to the
Pre-Auction Licensing Deadline in order to be protected in the repacking process. Stations that
fail to meet the deadline are not guaranteed protection in the repack.12
In the first half of 2015 the FCC will (1) issue orders related to LPTV, TV translators,
Part 15 of the rules, and wireless microphone spectrum use, (2) the Media Bureau will issue the
final catalog of repacking costs, the reimbursement process, and the post-auction transition to
new channels, (3) Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) will publish an updated baseline
list of broadcast facilities with their coverage areas and population served, and (4) conduct
bidder educational tutorials regarding pre-auction and post-auction procedures.13
Mid 2015 the FCC will begin the Incentive Auction. The Incentive Auction will roll out
in a four-step process. In step one the FCC will open the application process for the reverse
auction. This step will include: (1) opening prices for each bidding option to each eligible
broadcaster, (2) review broadcasters filings to participate in the auction, (3) notify qualified
applicants that they have qualified as bidders and provide them with their registration materials,
(4) based upon the number of committed qualified bidders, set the national spectrum clearing
target (e.g., 120 MHz), and (5) conduct a mock auction for qualified bidders.14 In step two the
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FCC will conduct the reverse auction to determine how much money will be required to make
incentive payments to broadcasters that relinquish some or all of their spectrum usage rights.15
In step three of the process the FCC will conduct the forward auction for the wireless providers.
In step four the process the FCC will evaluate the results of the reverse and forward auction to
determine if the auction closes or continues at a lower clearing target. If the proceeds from the
forward auction cover the incentive payments to the broadcasters relinquishing some or all of
their spectrum usage rights and meet the other revenue requirements (repacking and
administrative costs, to name two), then the forward auction will continue until there is no more
demand for licenses, and the Incentive Auction closes. If the proceeds from the forward auction
are not sufficient to satisfy the Final Stage Rule, the FCC will lower the spectrum clearing target
and repeat steps two and three until the Final Stage Rule is satisfied.16
Upon the successful completion of the Incentive Auction, the FCC will issue the Channel
Reassignment Public Notice announcing the final TV channel assignments for the stations that
have not voluntarily participated in the Incentive Auction.17 The FCC will then issue licenses to
the wireless providers that won spectrum usage rights in the forward auction as well as distribute
the auction proceeds to the broadcasters that voluntarily participated in the reverse auction and
relinquished some or all of their spectrum usage rights.18
For stations that participated in the Incentive Auction, they most terminate their broadcast
operations on their pre-auction channel within three months of receipt of the auction proceeds.19

15

FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 2.
FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 2.
17
FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2015, 2.
18
FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2015, 3.
19
FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 3.
16
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Three months following the release of the Channel Reassignment Public Notice,
broadcasters eligible for reimbursement of channel relocation costs (repacking costs) must
provide an estimate of those costs to the Media Bureau. Television stations that have been
assigned a new channel must also file their construction permit (CP) applications to operate on
their new channel.20
At this point the Media Bureau will: (1) go through their review process of the estimated
relocation costs submitted by the broadcasters being relocated, (2) issue initial funding to the
relocated broadcasters, (3) establish construction deadlines for relocated television stations, (4)
review actual relocation expenses, and upon approval of these expenses, release additional
funding to the broadcasters, and (5) open a limited window for operating LPTV and TV
translator stations to submit displacement applications.21
No later than 39 months after release of the Channel Reassignment Public Notice
broadcasters remaining on the air must complete their post-auction transition or go dark on their
pre-auction channels.22 It is this 39 month window that poses the greatest hurdle for the
relocated (repacked) broadcaster, and this “go dark on their pre-auction channels” requirement
that will push most broadcasters, in my opinion, to build interim facilities on their reassignment
channel as opposed to building an interim facility on their pre-auction channel.
The winning wireless providers will not be allowed to commence operations on their
newly acquired spectrum until the broadcasters have migrated to their post-auction channel
assignments.
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FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 3.
FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 3.
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FCC, “Estimated Timeline,” June 25, 2014, 3.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS
What will television broadcasting and wireless communications look like after “The
World’s Most Groundbreaking Spectrum Auctions” are done? Will the Middle Class Tax Relief
and Job Creation Act of 2012 have accomplished the second half of its title? Will the 600 MHz
spectrum auction create jobs?
The first thing we know, there will be fewer television stations operating over the air.
The FCC cannot achieve the goals set forth in the Spectrum Act of 2012 without several hundred
television stations relinquishing some or all of their spectrum usage rights. This may not have as
much of an impact on television viewers as one would initially think. In 2011, then FCC
Chairman Julius Genachowski said the percentage of viewers watching broadcast over the air,
rather than through cable or satellite, has fallen to less than 10 percent.1 So, while fewer
consumers get their television broadcasts over the air, that does not address the loss of
programming that would occur when these stations go off the air. Some of that programming
may be duplicated within a television market. As noted in Table 2, there are four PBS affiliated
stations in the New York television market. One would assume that there is some duplication of
programming occurring between the four stations.

1

Christopher Stewart, “Over-the-Air TV Catches Second Wind, Aided by Web,” Wall Street
Journal, February 21, 2012.
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With digital television, it is possible to provide more than one programming stream
within the assigned 6 MHz television channel. Many stations currently provide alternative
programming on secondary and tertiary channels, usually identified as channel number dot one
or dot two (26.1, 26.2, and 26.3). If there is sufficient demand within a market for the
programming from a station that voluntarily relinquishes its spectrum usage rights, a savvy
broadcaster will see the business opportunity and look to fill the need.
Consumers of wireless broadband will not initially see any benefit to the 600 MHz
auction. Wireless providers will not be able to begin using the spectrum usage rights they won in
the Incentive Auction until the broadcasters operating in the 600 MHz band have moved to their
new channels or gone off the air. Wireless providers will also have to build out the necessary
infrastructure for the new 5 + 5 MHz paired channels for the uplink and downlink operations.
While it is possible to begin building out the initial infrastructure while broadcasters continue to
operate in the 600 MHz band, the wireless providers will not be able to fully test their new
infrastructures capabilities until after the post-auction transition. The rollout of new services will
begin in the major markets and will help alleviate current wireless broadband congestion in these
markets. One should not expect to see widespread use of the 600 MHz band by wireless carriers
before the mid 2020s.
It is currently unknown whether the wireless providers will use the 600 MHz band
channels to provide support for their existing 2 GHz operating cellphone transmit and receive
operations, will use the 600 MHz channels as “trunk lines” carrying traffic between operating
cell towers, or will convert new cellphones to the new 600 MHz channels and utilize them for
transmit and receive operations. Many current cellphones have quad band capabilities. It is
possible to build new cellphones with five band (quint band) capabilities.
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What about job creation? If several-hundred television stations go off the air to free up
spectrum for wireless carriers, what happens to the jobs at the TV stations? Will the wireless
carriers pick up these displaced jobs? That is not likely. While the wireless carriers will require
some additional technical staff for building out the new 600 MHz infrastructure, most of the
newly created jobs will require applicants to have strong technical backgrounds. The majority of
the jobs lost by the TV stations going off the air are not technical, but are operational,
administrative, sales, and in some cases, news staff. The broadcast stations that remain on the air
after the repack will not be able to absorb the displaced jobs that will be created by the Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012.
The goals that will be accomplished by Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of
2012 are: (1) revenue to the U.S. Treasury (estimated between $10-45 billion), (2) more
spectrum for wireless broadband, and (3) a consolidated, more efficient use of the remaining
UHF band for television broadcasting.
What about the future of “over the air” broadcast television in twenty to twenty-five
years? With CBS’s recent announcement that consumers can subscribe to a monthly service and
access all of the network’s programming via broadband video streaming, what becomes of the
local network affiliate? The local network affiliate currently provides viewers with access to the
network programming as well as local news, weather, and sports. The question for the future
will be whether consumers are going to continue to “tune in” to the local station for network
programming or seek another source, to the demise of the local network affiliate.
It is the author’s opinion that the 600 MHz incentive auction and the subsequent
repacking of the remaining “over the air” television broadcasters will be the initial crack in the
foundation of the current commercial television business model that will ultimately lead to the
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collapse and demise of “over the air” television, as we know it, within twenty-five years. This
opinion is based on the fact that the current commercial television business model relies heavily
on the “must carry” rules for cable and satellite television providers and the payments the local
stations receive for allowing the cable and satellite operators to carry the local network affiliates.
If, as CBS has proposed, consumers can “cut the cable” and bypass both cable and satellite
distribution for the network programming by subscribing directly with the network, there is little
impetus on the part of the cable and satellite industry to continue to pay for “must carry” rights.
It is estimated that current “over the air” viewership of broadcast television hovers around 10
percent, an insufficient viewer base to build a successful business model on. If the consumer can
get the programming they want directly from the programming source, i.e., the television
network, on broadband devices that do not require access to cable or satellite television providers,
at a price that allows the consumer to “cut the cable”, then what purpose does the local network
affiliate provide?
Thus, the consequence of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 will
be to artificially create an early end to commercial television, and also create a total upheaval for
the television broadcast industry. This upheaval will last for years as the industry changes and
ultimately dies off.
Ideas of implementation on paper will certainly be different when set in motion, and there
will be no turning back once the paper process is started.
Once the 600 MHz band is converted to wireless broadband, what will be the next
spectrum block to be repurposed?
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Illustrations of FCC’s 11 Band Plans
The following illustrations show each of the FCC’s Band Plans for repurposing of the
600 MHz Band. Each band plan ends at the beginning of the 700 MHz band (channel 52). I
have removed the 700 MHz portion from the illustrations to increase the size and readability of
the illustrations. The color key identifies uplink, downlink, and guard bands.

42 MHz (2 pairs) Scenario

48 MHz (3 pairs) Scenario

60 MHz (4 pairs) Scenario

72 MHz (5 pairs) Scenario

78 MHz (6 pairs) Scenario

84 MHz (7 pairs) Scenario
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108 MHz (8 pairs) Scenario

114 MHz (9 pairs) Scenario

126 MHz (10 pairs) Scenario

136 MHz (11 pairs) Scenario

144 MHz (12 pairs) Scenario
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